- 12 May 2010
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- 3 Comments
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- Congress, Diplomacy, Events in Iran, Iran Election 2009, Sanctions
Video: Gates on Iranian politics
12 May 2010 Posted By Patrick Disney
[vodpod id=Video.3597223&w=425&h=350&fv=]
Secretary of Defense Gates spoke with CNN’s John King yesterday about the internal situation in Iran and whether the resentment and popular unrest following last year’s election is still continuing.
I think Secretary Gates is correct in saying that, despite things being calm on the surface, there is a reservoir of popular dissatisfaction among the Iranian people. That doesn’t mean that the regime will be overthrown tomorrow, nor does it even mean that there is going to be a huge protest on the anniversary of the June 12 election.
What it means is there is a whole political faction lying in wait.
Before last year’s election, progressives in Iran were largely Khatami-style reformists. Now, the progressive movement in Iran is made up of the Mousavi/Karroubi school of reform — in addition to the more radical viewpoints among a portion of the population, which supports abolishing the Islamic government altogether.
As for the matter of sanctions — Gates says they have “had an impact,” and that more sanctions will have “more of an impact.” But by defining the goal of sanctions (the “principal value,” as he says it) as political isolation for Iran, Secretary Gates shows a much more nuanced understanding of the sanctions issue than most sanctions proponents in Congress and among outside organizations.
To hear these people talk about it, sanctions are a magic bullet that can tear down Iran’s economy and bankrupt Tehran’s treasury.
Fortunately, Gates realizes that isn’t going to happen. So — we hope — the administration has a plan for what to do next, after the sanctions are put in place and before we realize that they haven’t made all of our wildest dreams come true…
3 Responses to “Video: Gates on Iranian politics”
Defenders of repressive governments, like the current Iranian government, typically follow the same formula: They excuse, and more importantly distract from the repression of the people by the government (e.g. downplay the killings, arrests and torture of dissidents, blame outside “enemies”, fear-mongering etc.). Then they point to the success of the repression as some sort of proof that the repressive government is popular with the people.
Sound familiar?
What plan could there possibly be after a successfully escalated sanctions regimen?
You know, Patrick, I recently used a NIAC form to write my congressperson and senator. Congressperson Eshoo didn’t bother to write back. But I did get a detailed response from the office of Dianne Feinestin. She states that her position is the US approach should be “carrots and sticks.”
Honestly, carrots and sticks have not worked for 31 years, and we’re expecting this latest application somehow will? If anything, the Islamic Republic of Iran is beginning to garner further support, particularly from members of NAM, who increasingly see the obvious hypocrisy of this US effort.
One other thing, I don’t really see the difference between a Khatami style reform and that of a Mousavi/Karroubi school of reform, that is to say from a grass roots vantage point. Sure, the issues of contention have been updated with time and by events. But what other distinctions are you referring to? Perhaps you could elaborate further on this in a future post.
Also, I think its more accurate to characterize the opposition movement in Iran as “an undercurrent” rather than a “a reservoir of popular dissatisfaction. “But that’s a quibble in the big picture of things.
“Also, I think its more accurate to characterize the opposition movement in Iran as “an undercurrent” rather than a “a reservoir of popular dissatisfaction. “But that’s a quibble in the big picture of things.”
Not surprisingly, I disagree both with Pirouz’s characterization of the opposition movement, and the claim that the characterization is not that important in the big picture.
I know many Iranians, both inside and outside of Iran. Of the Iranians I know outside of Iran, some have been here for many years, some for a few years, and a few of them who have been in the US for less than a year. Literally every Iranian I have spoken to, including a couple who are quite unhappy here in the US (they miss the city life in Tehran), either dislike or despise the current Iranian government. I have not met a single Iranian that speaks positively of the Iranian government. I have not even met a single Iranian that is neutral, or does not care.
While I will admit that the Iranians I have spoken to, both inside and outside of Iran, are well-educated and most of them do not come from a poor family. But, according to them, the opposition movement is very much a reservoir of popular dissatisfaction that includes the poor and rural areas. Personally, I trust these people’s perspectives much more than a poll conducted by phone in a country where any opposition to the government can lead to arrest, torture and sometimes execution.
One really needs to either go to Iran and/or speak with Iranians to accurately characterize the opposition movement. Furthermore, I also disagree that this is a “quibble”. I think it is critical to realize the extent of the dissatisfaction because of the implications it has for the future of Iran.