- 8 June 2012
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- NIAC round-up
IAEA and Iran fail to reach a deal ahead of political talks in Moscow, Where U.S. May “Go Big”
The United Nations nuclear watchdog has been working to broker an action plan to provide access to restricted sites, namely the Parchin facility, where there are suspicions Iran conducted conventional high-explosive tests ten years ago that may have had nuclear applications. After an inconclusive eight hour meeting today, no agreement was set and there is no date set for future talks. These results have cast a shadow on prospects for the P5+1 talks in Moscow later this month. (CNBC, 6/8/12) There was skepticism an agreement could be struck at the technical level with the IAEA before political talks in Moscow scheduled for June 18 between the P5+1 and Iran. (NYT, 6/8/12)
A recent leak of letters between the P5+1 AND Iran ahead of talks in Moscow suggests continued differences and a common reluctance to compromise. One letter shows an Iranian interest in assembling a meeting of experts ahead of the talks to solidify an agenda, to which EU leaders responded no further preliminary talks were necessary, because their goals for the talks hadn’t changed. (Washington Post, 6/8/12)
Meanwhile, is a growing number of experts suggest an incremental deal with Iran would not be successful, instead suggesting a “Go big” strategy is the only real option. Israeli fears and lack of confidence are contributing to the potential instability that an temporary solution would not encourage a reconvening nations anytime soon. (Al-Monitor, 6/7/12)
Notable Opinions
– Consequences of an Israeli strike: Colin Kahl, the former top Middle East policymaker at the Pentagon, and his colleagues summarize their recent CNAS report in Foreign Policy, “Red Red Lines“:
Given the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the option of using force should remain on the table. But the high risks and uncertain rewards mean it should be employed only if: (1) all nonmilitary options have been exhausted; (2) Iran has made a clear move toward weaponization; (3) there is a reasonable expectation that a strike would significantly set back Iran’s program; and (4) a sufficiently large international coalition is available first to help manage the destabilizing consequences of the strike and then to contain Iran and hinder it from rebuilding its nuclear program.
Today, a unilateral Israeli strike would not satisfy any of these criteria.
Read the full article at Foreign Policy.